out the post-war situation, but also to set new standards for its own action in the domain of the maintenance of international peace and security.
Nol only has the UNCC thus be<:ome a symbol of Ihis exceptional effort by the United Nations, but it has also introduced several novelties when compared with compensation commissions of the past\{)o The UNCC, in effect, was neither the fruit of the imposition of the victor's law over the vanquished power, as was the case in the Versailles TreatyLl, nor the result of an intergovernmental agreement, such as, for instance, tbat which created the Iran-United States claims tribunal 12 . It was not supposed to be a court, nor an arbittal tribunal. It was, on the contrary, an original Înternational organism, based on a special procedure adaptcd ta the circumstances and to the daims at stake, of which the primary goal was effectiveness, i.e. to bring justice, within the shortest possible timeframe, to the almost 2.7 million individuals who were victims of the lraqi invasion and occupation ofKuwait l3 .
This anicle will explore the most innovative aspects of the UNCC in its composition (1), its procedure (2) and its material competence (3) and will also try to answer the question of whether the Compensation Commission is capable of inspiring initiatives for future post-war settlements or, on the other band, is destined to rernain a unique occurrence (4).
An original composition
The UNCC was composed of three organs: the Governing Council, the pelitical decision-making organ, made of 15 rnembers e.ch representing the 15 members of the Security Council at aoy given lime; the Panels of Com.missioners, each made of three commissioners, experts in various fields, charged with examining claims and suggesting payments; and the Secretariat, the administrative organ of the Commission respon sible for the administration of the Compensation Fund.
This structure is unÎque in the history of claims commissions. ClainlS commissÎons of the past were, in effect, judicial bodies. They were usually composed of one sole organ resolving disputes on international law grounds which was constituted by arbitrators or commissioners, appointed by each of the parties to the dispute and 10 The expression "compensation commissions" as used in the present artide covers daims and compensation commissions, arbitral tribunals, international courts and mixed commissions dealing with compensation issues. For an overview of the notion of mixed commissions see Boisson de Chazoumes, CampaneJ/i general1y chaired by a neutral arbitrator or commîssioner l4 . The UNCC, on the contrary, had a dual structure with separate political and fact-finding organs. Although it possessed sorne similarities with judieial bodies, the UNCC did not perform a purely judieial funetion: the Seerelary-General in his report of 2 May 1991 affmned that "the commission is not a court or an arbitral tribunal before which the parties appear, it is a potitieal organ that perfonns an essentially fact-finding function of examining c1aims, verifying their validity, evaluating losses, assessing payments and resolving disputed claims. It is ooly in this last respect that a quasi-judicial function may be iDvolved"". Indeed, no organ of the lINCC bas been ealled to deeide legal issues, because the Security Couneil, in its Resolution 687, had already established lraq's responsibility under internationallaw for a series ofunlawful aets, a responsibility that did Dot need to be reviewed or reassessed by thé UNCC's orgaDs".
Moreover, Article 31 of the UNCC's Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure provided that the law to be applied by commissioners in the perfomlaDCe of their tasks was constituted by Security Council resolutions, Goveming Council decisions and "in addition, where necessary [ ... ] other relevant rules ofintemationallaw ..
17 , It appears quite clear that "other relevant rules of international law" were seen as a subsidiary source, 10 be used ooly "wbere necessary", ln other words, as opposed to traditional daims commissions, the UNCC operated on the basis of a lex specialis .;... that mostly developed through Govemiog Council decisions -and only wben necessary on the basis of intemationallaw 18 .
The main reason justifying bath the Compensation Commission 's tripartite structure and its applicable Law was that, in contrast to claims adjudication experiences of the past, the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait produced an incredibly high number of victims seeking compensation. No prior c1aims commission had adjudieated more than 20,000 claims", while the lINCC was expected to go through more than 2 million files. Considering that traditional claims commissions proceeded at a pace rarely exceeding 1,000 claims per year, these exceptional circumstance compelled the Secretary-General and the Seeurity Couneil to establish a far faster mechanism.
14 See Bedennan, "Historie Analogues of the UN Compensation Commission", in Lillich, op, cit., pp. 257 fT. a) The Governing Couneil The Goveming Council, as already mentioned, was the politieal decision·making body, composed of representatives of the Sccurity Couneil memhers. As an author has pointed out, '~he (externaJ) creator of the Commission, the Security Council. and the (internai) poliey-maker of the Commission, the Governing Couneil are effectively the same,,20. The only difference with the Seeurity Council is that at the UNCC Goveming Council there was no veto power. The composition of the Governing CouDeil eould have aliowed, in theory, the participation of Iraq, if eleeted as a non-pennanent member of the Security Counei1. However. this (unlikely) situation ncvcr cventuated.
The composition of the Goveming Council guaranteed the constant presence of States that partieipated in the Coalition which defeated Iraq. The independence and impartiality of this organ can thus be ehallenged. As a consequence, as it has been pointed our', the UNCC should not he considered a strictly super partes body. Furthermore, in the already eited Secretary-General report of 2 May 1991 there was no requirement that the Goveming Couneil aet according ta criteria of impartiality and independence. However, as regards the decisions on claims, it should he noted that throughout its practice the Goveming Council never once refused the recommendations of the Panels of Commissioners, de facto limiting ilS decision-making role vis-à-vis the reports of the Panels to mere adoption, Consequently, one could argue that as a matter of fact the organ which exc1usively took decisions on filed claims was not the Governing Council, but rather the Panels of Commissioners, which was also the organ, as we will subsequently see, in a better position, because of ils chamcteristics. to deal with tbe evaluation and the awarding of claims.
b) The Panels ofCommissioners Tbe Panels of Commissioners were composed of experts in fields relevant to the daims tbey were called upon 10 examine and an ofthem were chosen on the basis of their high international standing, with due regard to their Ugeographical representation, professional qualifications, experience and integrity"n, in order to guarantee their impartiality. As to their independence, the Commissioners were chosen from a list of experts established by the Seeretary-General, and appointed by the Goveming Council on the basis of recommendations made by the UNCC Executive Secre~] . These characteristics may be considered as proof of the Commissioners: independence and impartiality, whîch are typical and necessary elements ofmembers of claims commissions, lt must alsa be noted, however, Ihat the UNCC Panels of Commissioners also possessed a series of original features by reference ta commissioners of past daims commissions. First of ail they were not always legal experts -often they were rather experts in fields such as biology, medicioe, chemistry. financing, engineering etc. Secondly, they were not directly appointed, neither by the c1aimant Governmenls, flor by Iraq. Thirdly, the C<}mmissioners were neither acting arbitrators nor as judges, but rather "claims adjustors .. 25 , working on the sole basis of the evidence presented by daimants and with only a duty of notification ta Iraq (with the exception of environmental claims") Fourthly, they did not have fonnal decision-making powers, but only recornmendatory powers towards the Goveming Council (even if, as noted above, the Goveming Council never used its powers ta review or retum claÎms to the Panels for reconsideration).
As a result, the interplay between the Goveming Council and the Panels of Commissioners is also original: the former stated the principles to be applied ta different categories of claims, without having the power of examining specifie cases, but only ta adopt or to refuse the Panels of Commissioners' recommendations; white the latler's task was that of examining the claims, following Goveming Council decisions on daims processing, without a fonnal decision-making power.
c) The Secretariat and the Compensation Fund
The Secretariat, headed by its Executive Secretary, is the administrative organ of the Compensation Commission, servicing bath the Goveming Council and the Panels of Commissioners. In contrast ta dassic secretariats of daims commissions, its powers were not limited lo administrative functions as the Secretariat made preliminary assessments of daims "in arder to detemtine whether they [met] the fonnal requirements established by the Goveming Council't27. These assessments were to be taken into consideration by the Panels of Commissioners, according to Article 34 of the procedural rules 28 . This means that the Secretariat was granted an active participation in the process ofadjudicating on the claims. The Secretariat was also charged, as already noted, with administering the Compensation Fund, whieh is part and pareel of the UNCC system. The Compensation Fund is a unique feature of the UNCC. In traditional claims commissions, binding decisions of the commissioners or arbitrators were addressed to the concerned State which was obliged ta pay compensation directly to the c~aimant State. At the UNCC, on the other hand, successful c1aimants are indemnified with money taken from the Compensation Fund. The Compensation Fund is supplied exclusively through a percentage of the revenues obtained through the exports ofIraqi petroleum and petroleum products. A flXed percentage of the lraqi revenues in the petroleum export seclor'>9 -which was, until late 2003, under the control of the United Nations through the Oil-for-Food programme 30 -has been destined and will continue to he destined for the Compensation Fund throughout the payment process, which is still far from being concluded 31 . The money in the Compensation Fund is used not only to pay successful claimanlS, but also to pay ail the costs of the UNCC proceedings, facilities and personnel. Iraq. however, does not have any fonn of control over the payrnents. It has been stresse<! that this situation where ooly the defendant StateIraq -pays for the Commission 's costs without the possibility of benefiting from the Compensation Fund money for promoting its own interests before the UNCC (with the exception, however. of environmental c1aims)32 "create [d] an imbalance in the proceedings which flics in the face of elementary justice,,33.
2. An original procedure The approach of the UNCC to procedural issues ansÎng in its treatmem of claims is also very original. From the first days of ils activities, the Governing Council issued guidelines designed to assist the Panels of Commissioners in the perfonnance of their tasks. The daims were divided by the Goveming CauDcil, in ilS first decision, ioto six categories, named from "A" to "F", Category "A" was for individuals who tled from Kuwait or Iraq as a result of the invasion or occupation of Kuwait. Category " B" was for claims in relations to death or serious personal in jury resulting from the invasion or occupation of Kuwait. Successful claimants of categories "An and "B" were awarded lump-sums previously detennined by the Goveming CouDeil. Category "C" conc;emed individuals claiming for damages up to US$ 100,000, while category "D" was intended for individuals c1aiming for damages above US$ 100,000. Category "E" was for corporations and other legal entities and category "F" regarded claims of governrnents and international organizations, Categories "E" and "F" were further divided into several subcategories, for each of which the Goveming Council established a separate Panel of Commissioners, Subcategory "El " concemed claÎms made by the ail sector. Subcategory "E2" claims were claims of non-Kuwaiti corporations that did not faIl ioto any other subcategory of the "E" category. Subcategory "E3" related to daims of non-Kuwaiti corporations belonging to the field of construction and engineering (excluding corporations of the ail sector). "E4" claims were those of Kuwaiti corporations (excluding c1aims of ail corporations). Subcategory "Ft" concemed claims or lasses suffered by States and international organizations in connection with deparrure and evacuation of individuals and for damage to property belonging to States and to international organizatÎons. " F2" daims were those of lordan and Saudi Arabia. Subcategory uF3" dealt with daims filed by Kuwait, excluding environmental claims. Subcategory " F4" concemed claims for environmental damage. Finally, subcategory "ElF" related to claims in the field of export guarantee and insurance submirted both un der category "E" and category "F,,34. Furthermore, in the procedurai mies, the Govcming Council established 3s specifie procedural mechanisms and evidentiary requirements for each claims categOl).3 6 .
The six claims categories were divided into two main groups, namely urgent and non-urgent daims. Urgent claims were those belongÎng ta categories HA", "B" and "e" (ail conceming claims of individuals) which were given priority over the other, non-urgent, categories. lt Îs the tirst time in the history of cJaims commissions that such a meticulous and sophisticated categorization was made. The adaptation of procedural and evidentiary features depending on the claims' characteristics i5 also unique. Such particularities have been c1early dictated by the context of mass processing and inspired by the necessity to give practieal justice, within a short delay of time, to the c1aimants -especially those who filed c1aims belonging to urgent categones.
A. regard. the procedure before the UNCC, it .hould he noted that thi. was not exactly an adversarial procedure, fully based on elements of the classical concept of "due process of law" (i.e. a right to defence, a balance in the burden of proof and a reasonable period of time in the settlement of the dispute). There were undeniably several elements of due process in the UNCC procedure, in particular the attention to the fast treatment of claims. However, a true right to defence for Iraq and a perfect balance in the burden of proof was clearly lacking". According to the debates that surrounded the aftennath of the Secretary-General report of 2 May 1991 JS , it was necessary that "sorne element of due process of law be buitt into the procedure,,39. However, this path was not followed during the negotiations for the creation of the UNCe and the right to due process of law bas been restricted. The rationale for this was that the requirement of a minimum standard of right to defence was to be balanced by the claimants' right to have (heir claims adjudicated within the shorlest possible period of time 40 . Lraq's right to defence was thus limited to its subrnission of its views and opinions to the Panels of Cornmissioners (the latter, however, being obliged neither to endorse these comments, nor to mention them in their reports). Iraq could do so in three cases, namely: at the preliminary assessment of the claims made by the Secretariat (article 16 of the Provision.1 Rules)"; where the Panels of Commissioners, in their discretion, determined that a case was "unusually large and complex" permirting Iraq to provide wrirten submissions and to participate in oral proceedings (article 36 (a) of the Provisional Rules); and for environmental "F4" daim. for whicb, because of the "complexity and the Iimited amount of relevant international practice"'u, Iraq was allowed not only to submit ils views, but a150 to benefit from the assistance of experts for preparing its comments (Goveming Council Decision l24t 3 .
As regards a balance in the burden of praof, as aIready mentioned,the procedural rules elaborated different burdens for different daims categories: for categories considered as urgent, evidentiary requirements were lower than those required for non-urgent claims. For categories "A" and '~B", for instance, the claimant simply needed to present documentary evidence of the relevant facts . and even a written statement of the claimant was in sorne cases considered sufficient benefited from a simplified evidence regime -especially lump-suffi claims -and for non-urgent daims (where higher amounts of maney were at stake), evidence was to be more fully substantiated. This multi-speed regime for evidence is another unique feature of the UNCC and it answered to the need for rapid treatment of individuals' urgent claims in particular. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that daims categories requiring tittle evidence were also those for which lump-suffis were quickly provided ta successful claimants.
The features mentioned above are not the only departures the UNCC regime made from traditional daims commissions. It should be added that Iraq did not have access to the evidence presented by claimants and that ail hearings before the Panels of Commissioners, until the moment of the adoption of the Panel's recommendations by the Goveming Counci!, were strictly confidential 47 • 3. A noteworthy novelty in the material competence of the UNCC: the compensability of environmental damage
Resolution 687, in its paragraph 16, specified that environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources were also to be inc1uded in compensable damage. As has already been pointed out, the environment was not mentioned in Resolution 686, which is the first resolution that established Iraq's responsibility. This precision concerning the environmental damage was not technically necessary for environmental damage to be included among compensable damage, because of the simple fact that the resolution in question established general compensability for "any direct loss, damage [ ... ] and in jury". On the condition that it could be proven to be an instance of direct damage, any environmental damage would have been compensable even without the precision of paragraph 16. In other words, on the one hand Resolution 687 has established for the first time in histOly a State's liability for environmental damage caused during an anned conflict; on the other the legal basis for this compensability came from "a violation of the prohibition of the use of force" and thus "other basts for compensation which may also Another novelty in the treatment of environmental damage consists in the faet that the costs incurred by States for monitoring and asscssing the environmental damage they suffered were admitted before the UNCC as compensable activities. Following a 1998 agreement hetween sorne c1aimant States and tbe UNCC, the Goveming Couneil agreed to give priority to "monitoring and assessment claims" and to resolve them separately from substantive claims, to which they originally belonged sl . The reason for this choice was that, in order to establish whether or not an environmental damage was imputable to the lraqi illegal war activities, costly studies and surveys were necessary, for tbe conduct of which claimant States were considered to be in a better position tban the competent Panel. Once again, this approach gave the Commission the opportunity to save time in tbe processing and adjudication of c1aims.
ft seems debatable, now, whether these srudies and surveys should he considered as evîdence of the damage sufIered 52 , or rather as fact-finding activities, which was a task typically assigned to tbe Panels of Commissioners. The " F4" Panel of CommissioneTS specified that "the purpose of monitoring and assessrncnt is to enable a claimant to develop evidence to establish whether environmental damage bas occurred and 10 quantify the extent of the resulting loss .. 53. In any casc, as far as the present This is the reason why there is no definition of "environmenl" and of"naturaJ resources" neither in resolution 687, Dor in any Goveming Council decision: a detinition of "environment" or a distinction between "environment" and "llatural resourus" is of no great inrerest berore the UNCC, given that the $Cope of its jurisdiction is based on the directness of the causal link between a damage and the invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and not on the definition of "en.,.ironment" . 51 107 "monitoring and assessment" daims have been filed before the UNCC, over a total of 168 substantive environmental claims. Kazazi, op. writers know. this is the first time in the history of claims commissions that costs incurred in collecting the evidence necessary for the su bmission of claims were deemed compensable.
AS to the treatment of substantive environmental claims, the most noteworthy clement is the adherence of the " F4" Panel's recornmendations to international environmentallaw governing causality and evaluation issues, as well as to the customary law of State responsibilitl 4 . Conceming causality, the mest complex activity of ail Pane ls of Cornrnissioners has been that of detenn in ing whether an instance of damage direct ly ste rnmed from the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, i.e. through an unbroken chain of cause-tc-effect events. Applicable Goveming Council Decisions, namely Decision 1 55 and Decision 7 56, gave sorne guidance ta the Panels, by enumerating a non-exhaustive list of situations where damage was to be considered direct. However, no Governing Council decision provided for a definition of "direct damage", thus obliging the Commissioners ta elaborate their own "jurisprudence", mainly by reference to general international law. [n addition, the "F4" Panel, in contrast to other panels, was called 10 adjudicate on claims for environmental damage du ring an armed conflict, a subject lhat had never before been treated by-any daims commission.
Another interesting and novel feature of the UNCC work on environmental daims is that environmental cJaims -bath substantive and monitoring and assesgment claims -have been submitted to compulsory fo llow-up tracking in order to eosure that the payment of the award be used by successful claimanl States to reach agreed environmental objectives and standards 57 .
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Only few exceptions can be reported, such as, for instance, the systematic rejection by the The particular position of Iraq before the "F4" Panel of Commissioners has already been diseussed s8 . It is however important 10 recall that Jraq's situation was sui generis both compared with typical daims commissions or international courts or tribunals, and with regard to the Iraqi position before other Panels of Commissioners~ because of the modifications inuoduced by Goveming Couneil Decision 124. As a result of this decision, the interplay between Iraq and ,he " F4" Panel of CommissÎoners, if cornpared to the procedure followed for other claims' categories, was more similar to that existing before international courts or tribunals between c1aim-ants and arbitrators s9 • 4. Conclusions: uniqueness or a model for the future?
The UNCC was envisaged and created in a very particular historica! and political context. Firstly, an extraordinary enforcement action of the UN Security Council was organized against aState which manifestly breached international peace and secunty within the meaning of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Seeondly, the extremely high number of potential c1aimants forced the Security Council to create a special adjudicatory mechanism, using new methods of mass claims processing in order to guarantee fast and effective justice for claimants in need of aid. In the future. probably only the simultaneous presence of these t'Wo fundamental elements could give rise to an outcome similar to Resolution 687 and the creation of a body resembling ta the UNCC. In cases not similar ta that of Iraq in 1990-1991 , traditional mechanisms of claims settlement remain still valid today -at least when the number of claims is not extremely high -as the reeent example of the EritreaEthiopia Claims Commission (which is an arbitral tribunal) shows 60 . Not ail particularities of the UNCC are destined to remain unique. In several respects -from a legal as well as from a praetieal point of view -the UNCC could serve as a perfect model for other compensation bodies. An adjudicatory organism created and operating uoder the control of the UN is likely to be proposed again in the future. The control exercised by the United Nations, if oot a guarantee of impartiality and indepeodence in the processing of claims, gives better assurances as ta the effectiveness of the adjudicatory process and avoids the risk that the victorious State's will is unilaterally imposed over that ofthe defeated State.
Another aspect susceptible to subsequent imitation consists in the techniques used for the treatment of a massive number of claims. the hîghest in the history of daims commissions, namely: claims categorization, the taking into account ofurgency, the 58 See supra pp, [10] [11] op. cir., p. 128 participation of experts in the Panels of cornrnissioners, different evidentiary requirements as a function lxJth ofurgency and of the size of the c)aÎros. These are but sorne of the novelties introduced by the UNCC that could be followed and developed by furuee adjudicatory bodies ca lied on to process a high number of claims.
As to the Compensation Fund, the idea of a fund managed by an independem organ and complllsorily supplied by the guilty State. constitutes a guarantee for successful c1aimants that their compensation will not be subjecl to the will of the debtor State, nOT 10 the uncenainties of ils internai paliey, and that il will be liquidated within reasonable time. The scheme of the Compensation Fund, moreover, also proved to be useful in safeguarding the debtor State's çconomy: the UNCC Compensation Fund, supplied by fixed percentages of the Traqi revenues in the domain of the exportation of oil and petroleum products pennits Iraq to carry out its obligation to give compensation to successful claimants without overcoming a fixed percentage of its petroleum industry revenues, thus limiting the risk of serious detrimental effects on the lraqi economy.
Finally, future references to the-UNCC organs' decisions and recommendations for the development of international law and in the domain of claims settlement seems ralher unlîkely because, as pointed out above, the UNCC worked on the basis its own Jex speciaJis
•
An evaluation of definitive data about the work of the UNCC, dîsclosed in August 2007 62 , helps to corroborale our tentative conclusions -especially conceming the effectiveness of the UNCC process. Out of a total of almost 2.7 million claims, about 1.5 million have been awarded compensation. The 1.2 million c1aims lhat have becn discarded were almost entirely category "C" c1aims, which constituted the highest number of claims (1. 7 million). On the contrary, the second highest number of c1aims, category "A" daims, were almost ail awarded a lump-sumo This is c1early a consequence of the different evidentiary requirements for these two categories of claims -heavier for category "C", lighter for category "A".
Another interesting fact emerges in relation to the highest arnounts c1aimed. "F3" claims (those ofthe Kuwaiti govemment, excluding environmental claims) sought a total of almost US$114 billion, followed by "F4" claims with about US$ 85 billion. These two subcategories are characterized by a low percentage of awarded arnount against claimed amount (around 6-7%), while the 67 "El " daims (those of the oil sector) were awarded the highest compensation -US$ 21.5 billion, which is almost halfofthe total compensation awarded by the UNCC (US$ 52.4 billion).
This data clearly eeflects the two-speed procedure of the UNCC, the faster speed for urgent cJaims, the slower for non-urgent ones. The Compensation Commission's 61
Bcdennan, op. cil., pp. 286-287. See supra pp. 4-5. 62 The data referrcd to in this article are available at www.uncc.ch. effectiveness in the treatment of urgent daims is evidenced by the short delay of time within which these claims have been processed and paid: the category "A" Panel of Commissioners completed its work in 1996; the category "B" Panel in 1995; and the category "c" Panel in 1999. Ali these daims were the first to be paid in their entirety. Thus, the success of the Compensation Commission in its deterrnination to bring economic aid as quickly as possible to distressed individuals is undeniable and, as a consequence of this clear success, the UNCC methods and techniques should be taken into consideration for future cases of mass urgent individual daims.
The data also shows that the UNCC awarded the highest surns to category "E" daims (about US$27 billion), followed by category "F" (about 14 billion) and by individua! daims (about II billion), despite the fact that category "E" daims were 4,000, category "F" 185 and individual daims almast 2 million. Moreaver, as a matter of fact, "El" daims and "E4" claims (claims of Kuwaiti corporations, excluding those of the oil sector) are the only subcategories among ail non-urgent claims subcategories where compensation sought exceeded US$ll billion (namely "El", "E2", "E4" and a11 "F" subcategories), presenting a percentage of awarded amount against claimed amount higher than 20% (48.1 % for "El" daims and 29.3% for "E4" claims).
It was pointed out in 1995 that "there is in the air an as yet undefined and undedared policy of the major powers not to treat Iraq 100 harshly with respect to those reparations. and thus not ta pennit tao many billions of dollars in awards. The idea, not unreasonably, is to ensUfe that Iraq['s][ ... ] economy not be injured by difficult reparations, and that the Commissioners recognize these policy considerations through strict application of the jurisdictional and merits requirements,,63. Now that the Commission has ended its work, it might be important to look back on tbis statement and to assess in economic as weil as political tenns the overall set of decisions and recommendations of the UNCC.
63 Rovine and Hanessian, "T oward a Foreseeability Approach to Causation Questions at the United Nations Compensation Commission", in Lillich, op. cil., p. 238.
